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ABSTRACT
We construct and test a new model of employer-provided health insurance provision in the presence
of adverse selection in the health insurance market. In our model, employers cannot observe the
health of their employees, but can decide whether to offer insurance. Employees sort themselves
among employers who do and do not offer insurance on the basis of their current health status and
the probability distribution over future health status changes. We show that there exists a pooling
equilibrium in which both sick and healthy employees are covered as long as the costs of job
switching are higher than the persistence of health status. We test and verify some of the key
implications of our model using data from the Current Population Survey, linked to information
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Understanding the connection between health insurance provision and the labor market is impor-
tant. The labor market is the principal source for the private provision of health insurance in the
United States, presumably because of the large subsidy for it in the tax code.1 A common justiﬁca-
tion for this system is that employer provision ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health
insurance provision. A job is a place where people come together for reasons other than health
insurance.2 Though this is a widely held position among economists,3 there has been very little the-
oretical work delineating the conditions under which the labor market solves the adverse selection
problem in health insurance, and very little applied work measuring its empirical importance.
Here, we develop a simple theoretical model of adverse selection where employees can choose
between employers that do and do not provide health insurance. In our theory, employers choose
whether to provide health insurance without knowing whether workers are sick or healthy. Work-
ers, knowing their current health status and the distribution over future health status changes,
allocate themselves among employers. As workers transition among health states, they may change
insurance status by switching among employers. However, friction (caused by the development of
job-speciﬁc human capital) induces stickiness in the employment relationship, and creates costs for
employees who want to switch jobs. Under certain conditions, there is a pooling equilibrium in
which both sick and well workers choose jobs with insurance. The main conclusion from the theory
is that the labor market solves the adverse selection problem if jobs are stickier than is health
status.
In our empirics, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS) in conjunction with data from
the U.S. Census and O*NET, a survey collected by the Dept of Labor, to explore the determinants
of employer provided health insurance and to test our theory. We ﬁnd that workers in industries
characterized by ﬂuid labor markets and lower requirements for job-speciﬁc human capital are
less likely to have employer-provided health insurance. On the other hand, employees working
1The favorable tax treatment of employer health insurance provision results in an annual subsidy of over $100
billion dollars (Gruber, 2001). Approximately 80% of the under-65 population who are insured receive their insurance
through employers (their own or their spouse’s). (Authors’ calculations using Census Bureau (2003), Table 152). Of
the 41 million uninsured, about three ﬁfths are employed adults.
2We thank David Balan (repeating George Deltas) for this formulation.
3For example, the leading health economics text says ”group purchase by employers addresses the problem of
adverse selection,” (Folland et al., 2004). This sentiment is repeated in many places (Cutler, 2002; Gruber and
Levitt, 2000; Buchmueller et al., 2002).
1in industries characterized by higher requirements for general human capital are no more likely
than other employees to receive health insurance through their employers. Finally, job-speciﬁc
human capital predicts employer-provided health insurance coverage only for healthy employees,
not for unhealthy employees. These ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of model and
the combination of ﬁndings is diﬃcult to explain without our model. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd
that adverse selection plays a small role in explaining why some employers do not provide health
insurance to their workers.
2 Background
Many economists believe that adverse selection in health insurance leads to uninsurance. However,
such equilibrium uninsurance is not consistent with traditional models of adverse selection (Roth-
schild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977). When equilibria exist in the traditional models, they call
for separating equilibria in which both low and high risk types are insured, and low risk types are
underinsured.
Because uninsurance is such an important phenomenon in health insurance markets and be-
cause traditional models do not accommodate uninsurance, we specify a model that is capable of
generating uninsurance. Our theory diﬀers from the traditional approach in our assumption of
ﬁxed insurance characteristics. Insurers are not permitted to oﬀer less generous insurance: they
may oﬀer either full insurance or no insurance at all.
In fact, there is only limited heterogeneity in the ﬁnancial characteristics of health insurance
oﬀerings, that is in deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, disease coverage exclusions, out of pocket
maxima, and lifetime limits (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). Furthermore, the plans that are most
generous in ﬁnancial characteristics are health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which are ex-
tensively documented to receive favorable selection (see Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998).
There are several reasons for this limited heterogeneity. First, in order to qualify for favorable
tax treatment, employers are limited in their ability to oﬀer diﬀerent health beneﬁts to diﬀerent
employees (Gruber, 2001). Second, there is both federal and state legislation mandating the cov-
erage of various conditions and procedures (Kaestner and Simon, 2002; Gruber, 1994). Finally,
courts frequently fail to enforce exclusions in coverage (Epstein, 2000).
The model of adverse selection ours is most similar to is that of Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). In
2their model, there are two ﬁxed types of insurance, a generous type and a stingy type. Employees
allocate themselves between these two types according to the employees’ health status. They
examine adverse selection in the choice of plans oﬀered within the same employer; they do not
examine adverse selection in the choice of employers. Empirical examinations of this model appear
in Cutler and Reber (1998) and Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002).
Another closely related model is provided by Crocker and Moran (2003). They study the ability
of labor market stickiness to solve the commitment problem discussed in Cochrane (1995). They
ﬁnd that increasing labor market stickiness increases the ability of the labor market to solve the
commitment problem. However, they assume from the beginning that there is no asymmetric
information problem.
Empirically, our approach bears some similarity to that of the job lock literature (Holtz-Eakin,
1994; Cooper and Monheit, 1994; Monheit and Cooper, 1994; Madrian, 1994; Gruber and Madrian,
1997). That literature documents a link between turnover and health insurance provision. Employ-
ees who receive health insurance from their employers are less likely to leave their jobs for new ones.
By contrast with that literature, our work posits the inverse causal relationship: that employers
in industries characterized by high rates of employment turnover are less likely to provide their
workers with health insurance. Also, our empirical focus is not simply on the relationship between
turnover and health insurance provision; in our main empirical work, we are more concerned with
how job-speciﬁc human capital requirements aﬀect health insurance coverage rates.
3 Model of Health Insurance in the Labor Market
Our goal is to construct the simplest possible model that demonstrates how adverse selection in
health insurance interacts with job choice decisions in a setting where workers can only get health
insurance through their employers. To this end, we construct a two period model of the labor and
health insurance markets. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms set wages and health insurance oﬀerings and
then workers choose among employers. Each worker (but no ﬁrm) can observe which of two types,
sick or well, he is. After the job choice, each worker receives a health shock that induces a demand
for medical care. Sick workers draw their health shocks from a worse distribution than do well
workers. Uninsured workers pay for their use of medical care, while insured workers’ employers pay
for their use.
3At the start of the second period, workers may change health states with some known probability.
Then, each worker experiences involuntary turnover, again with some known probability. A turned
over worker then may choose a new employer. Next, each worker who did not turn over involuntarily
may choose to turn over voluntarily in order to change his health insurance status. To do so, he
must incur a switching cost. Then, another health shock is realized and medical care consumption
decisions are made again.
3.1 Assumptions
The timing of the model is:
1. Period 1
i. Employers set wage and beneﬁt levels
ii. Workers see their health state (sick or well)
iii. Workers choose their employer
iv. Health shock realized, medical care consumption
2. Period 2
i. Workers see their new health state
ii. With probability τ workers involuntarily turn over and may seek a new employer
iii. Workers who do not involuntarily turnover may choose whether to switch employers
iv. Health shock realized, medical care consumption
3.1.1 Sickness Transitions
In period 1ii, workers are sick with probability PS and healthy with probability PW = 1 − PS.
Employers observe these probabilities, but not whether any particular worker is sick. In period 2i,
healthy workers become sick with probability PSW and sick workers become healthy with probability
PWS.
We assume that the original distribution of health states is the steady state distribution induced
by these transition probabilities so that the fraction of sick workers, PS, is the same in both periods.
Thus, PS = PSW
PSW+PWS.
4Furthermore, we assume that health is sticky; the probability of being sick in period 2 is higher
for workers who were sick in period 1:
PWS < PWW (1)
3.1.2 Consumers’ Utility
Consumers derive utility from health, H and from the consumption of other goods, C according to
a utility function U(C,H) = u(C) + v(H). The initial health stock is H0, and health is produced
from medical care, m, by a health production function. The health production function is subject
to a random shock, ǫ. For a consumer lacking health insurance, the utility maximization problem
and its solution are:
maxmu(Y − m) + v(H0 + f(m,ǫ))
∗





We also consider a consumer covered by health insurance, and we model health insurance in
a very simple way. We assume that health insurance is “ﬁrst dollar” insurance and that no eﬀort
is made by the insurer to control moral hazard, so that the problem and solution for an insured
consumer are:
maxmu(Y ) + v(H0 + f(m,ǫ))
ˆ m given by f1 = 0
ˆ m = ˆ m(ǫ)
Now, we assume that there are two types of consumers, sick and well, and that these two types
diﬀer in their distribution functions for ǫ, so that FS is larger than FW in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance. The cost of insuring a sick person is therefore CS = EFS(ˆ m(ǫ)), while the
5cost of insuring a well person is CW = EFW(ˆ m(ǫ)).
Finally, we make conventional assumptions on the utility and production functions:
1. u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0
2. f1 > 0, f2 < 0, f12 > 0, f concave.
3. f1 ≤ 0 for m > ˜ m(ǫ). The futility point is ˜ m(ǫ).
There are four possible combinations of sickness and insurance status, with four associated
levels of utility:
USU(Y ) = EFSmaxmU(Y − m,H0 + f(m,ǫ))
USI(Y ) = EFSmaxmU(Y,H0 + f(m,ǫ))
UWU(Y ) = EFWmaxmU(Y − m,H0 + f(m,ǫ))
UWI(Y ) = EFWmaxmU(Y,H0 + f(m,ǫ))












Now, we argue for a single-crossing property for health insurance. Consider that health insur-
ance is sold at a price p to an individual with income Y . We show here that a sick consumer has a
higher value for insurance than a well consumer.
Consider, viewed as a function of ǫ, the ex post utility value of insurance:
maxmU(Y,H0 + f(m,ǫ)) − maxmU(Y − m,H0 + f(m,ǫ)) (2)
6The derivative of this expression is, by the envelope theorem:









f2. Since health is higher when insured and since v is concave,
0 < ˜ v′ <
∗
v′ Since f12 > 0 and since health care consumption is higher when insured
∗





f2 < ˜ v′ ˜ f2 < 0
Thus, the ex post value of insurance is increasing in ǫ. Now, since FS
FOSD
> FW we conclude that
the ex ante value of insurance is higher for the sick than for the well. Furthermore, since income
and premium played no role in the argument above (by virtue of the additive separability of U),
this is true for any income level and for any insurance premium.
In the second period, each worker has an identical utility function, except that he suﬀers a
switching cost of c utils should he choose to switch employers. Each worker’s utility for the whole
game is the ﬁrst period utility plus a discount factor, β, times his second period utility.
Finally, we will assume that there are gains to insurance but that these gains are small enough
that the well workers would prefer not to have insurance at the pooling price. Denoting the
willingness to pay for insurance of type i, Wi, we assume
CW < WW < PSCS + PWCW < CS < WS (4)
It is eﬃcient for each worker to be insured, but at the one shot pooling price the well workers
would choose not to be.
3.1.3 Employers
There are many identical, risk neutral employers, having access to a constant returns production
function of a single input, labor. Each worker supplies a single unit of labor per time period, which
has a marginal value product to the employer of M.
Each employer sets a wage and a beneﬁts policy (health insurance or no health insurance) in the
ﬁrst period. The wages and beneﬁts policy then applies to all workers who work for this employer
in each of periods 1 and 2.
An employer not oﬀering insurance and paying a wage of W earns proﬁts of M − W on each
7worker choosing him in period 1 and proﬁts of β(M − W) on each worker choosing him in period
2.
An employer oﬀering insurance and paying a wage of W −p earns a proﬁt of M −W +p−CW −
P1(CS −CW) on each worker choosing him in period 1 and proﬁts of β(M −W +p−CW −P2(CS −
CW)) on each worker choosing him in period 2. The probability (in equilibrium) that a worker is
sick given that they are working at an insuring employer at period 1 is P1 and the probability that
a worker is sick given that he is working at an insuring worker at period 2 is P2.
3.2 Solution
We next search for conditions under which there is a “pooling” equilibrium. For us, a pooling
equilibrium is a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with the properties
that:
1. In period 1, both sick and well workers choose an employer oﬀering insurance
2. In period 2, neither sick nor well workers voluntarily turn over to change their insurance
status
By symmetric, we mean that all sick consumers play the same strategy, all well consumers play
the same strategy, all insuring ﬁrms pay the same wages, and all non-insuring ﬁrms pay the same
wages.
Our strategy will be constructive. We will build the equilibrium, noting as we go conditions
suﬃcient to induce the desired behavior. Then, we will argue that no ﬁrm and no consumer has
any incentive to deviate from the constructed equilibrium. Finally, we will argue that if any of our
suﬃcient conditions fail then some ﬁrm or consumer will have an incentive to deviate, and this will
allow us to conclude that our conditions are necessary and suﬃcient.
Because there is Bertrand competition among ﬁrms in period 1i, ﬁrms will earn zero proﬁts,
W = M, and p will be set at the average discounted cost of providing insurance. In a pooling
equilibrium, in the ﬁrst period, all workers are insured. In the second period, all non-turned-
over workers are insured and all turned-over workers who are sick are insured—the only uninsured
workers are involuntarily turned-over workers who are well. With competitive conditions among
employers oﬀering insurance, employers will earn zero proﬁts on insurance:
8ˆ p + β [(1 − τ)ˆ p + τPSˆ p] = PSCS + PWCW + β [(1 − τ)(PSCS + PWCW) + τPSCS]
ˆ p =
(1 + β(1 − τ))(PSCS + PWCW) + βτPSCS
1 + β(1 − τ) + βτPS
(5)
3.2.1 Workers, Period 2
Consider a worker in period 2ii who has involuntarily turned over. Let W be the highest prevailing
wage at a ﬁrm not oﬀering insurance and p be the diﬀerence between W and the highest prevailing
wage at a ﬁrm oﬀering insurance. Then, the turned-over worker will choose an employer with
insurance if:
if well : UWI(W − p) > UWU(W) (6)
if sick : USI(W − p) > USU(W) (7)
By the assumptions already made, at the pooling price, ˆ p, the turned-over sick worker chooses
insurance and the turned-over well worker does not.
Now, let’s consider an insured worker who is not involuntarily turned-over but is considering
turning over. This worker will turn over if:
if well : UWU(W − p) − c > UWI(W) (8)
if sick : USU(W − p) − c > USI(W) (9)
By the single crossing property, it will be enough to argue that the well worker will not turn
over in this situation in order for the sick worker also not to turn over. To get the well worker not
to turn over here, we do need to assume that the switching cost is great enough:
UWU(W − p) − c < UWI(W) (10)
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for pooling behavior in period 2 at the pooling equilibrium
9price is for equation 10 to hold at a price ˆ p.
3.2.2 Workers, Period 1
Next, we seek conditions to ensure that both sick and well workers will choose insurance in period
1. We will ﬁrst develop the relevant value functions for the decision, then we will argue that if
the well workers choose insurance then so will the sick workers. Finally, we will derive conditions
suﬃcient for the well workers to choose insurance.
Consider the value of the game at the start of period 2ii, after the determination of the period
2 health state but before it has been determined whether a worker will turnover:
VWI = τUWU + (1 − τ)max{UWU − c,UWI} (11)
VWU = τUWU + (1 − τ)UWU (12)
VSI = τUSI + (1 − τ)USI (13)
VSU = τUSI + (1 − τ)max{USU,USI − c} (14)
Now, consider a well worker in period 1iii, who is considering which employer to choose. If he
chooses an employer with insurance (that is, the insuring ﬁrm with the highest W − p), he will
receive:
UWI(W − p) + β [PWWVWI + PSWVSI] (15)
And, if he chooses an employer without insurance (that is, the non-insuring ﬁrm with the highest
W), he will receive:
UWU(W) + β [PWWVWU + PSWVSU] (16)
Therefore, he will choose insurance if:
UWI(W − p) − UWU(W) + β [PWW(VWI − VWU) + PSW(VSI − VSU)] > 0 (17)
Similarly, a sick worker will choose to be insured if:
10USI(W − p) − USU(W) + β [PWS(VWI − VWU) + PSS(VSI − VSU)] > 0 (18)
Next, we show that if well workers choose insurance, then so do sick workers. As we argued
above, single crossing implies USI(W −p)−USU(W) > UWI(W −p)−UWU(W). Furthermore, the
only diﬀerence in the terms under the β is that, for the sick, higher weight is placed on VSI − VSU
relative to VWI − VWU, by inequality 1. Thus, the term under the β is bigger for sick workers
if (VWI − VSU) − (VWI − VWU) > 0, but this is clearly the case since (VWI − VWU) < 0 and
(VSI − VSU) > 0.
Therefore, we will only seek conditions which guarantee that well workers choose insurance.
Again, the well worker chooses insurance if inequality 17 holds. Since UWI − WWU < 0 and
VWI − VWU < 0 at the pooling price, we need:
PWW <
1
β(UWI − UWU) + VSI − VSU
VSI − VSU + VWU − VWI
=
VSI − VSU




VSI − VSU + VWU − VWI
So, the conditions we have derived thus far call for the following inequalities to hold at the
pooling price, ˆ p:
UWU − c < UWI (19)
PWW <
VSI − VSU




VSI − VSU + VWU − VWI
(20)
3.2.3 Suﬃciency and Necessity
Next, we show that no ﬁrm and no worker has an incentive to deviate from the putative pooling
equilibrium given our assumptions and conditions 19 and 20. In the case of workers, that there
is no incentive to deviate follows directly from the construction of the equilibrium. We thus need
only demonstrate that ﬁrms face no incentive to deviate.
In equilibrium, insuring ﬁrms pay wages M −ˆ p while non-insuring ﬁrms pay wages M. All ﬁrms
11are earning zero proﬁts (by construction of ˆ p). Since ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between oﬀering and not
oﬀering insurance at these prices, there is no incentive for any ﬁrm to switch from oﬀering to not
oﬀering or vice versa.
Among non-oﬀering ﬁrms, a wage increase would result in either negative proﬁts (if any workers
subsequently chose them) or zero proﬁts (if no worker did). A wage decrease would result in zero
proﬁts since no workers would continue to choose them.
Among oﬀering ﬁrms, a wage decrease would result in zero proﬁts, as all workers would choose
other oﬀering ﬁrms instead of the wage decreasing one. A wage increase would result in all workers
choosing the now higher-wage ﬁrm in period 1. Period 2 behavior by workers would also be the
same, except possibly for turned-over well workers. By reducing ˆ p below the pooling price, it is
conceivable that the deviating ﬁrm could induce turned-over well workers to choose to be insured.
However, to do this, ˆ p would have to fall below WW and this would ensure that the ﬁrm earns
negative proﬁts.
Since neither ﬁrms nor consumers have an incentive to deviate under conditions 19 and 20,
we conclude that these conditions are suﬃcient for the pooling equilibrium. Furthermore, the
conditions are plainly necessary. Without condition 19, well workers will not pool ex post and
without condition 20, well workers will not pool ex ante.
3.3 Comparative Statics of Pooling
Consider the role of switching costs, c, in conditions 19 and 20. Obviously, the higher c is, the more
likely it is that condition 19 holds.
Consider condition 20. The quantity VSI −VSU = (1−τ)[USI − max{USU,USI − c}] is increas-
ing in c. On the other hand, the quantity VWU − VWI = (1 − τ)[UWU − UWI] is invariant under
changes in c. The second term in condition 20 is decreasing in c since the numerator is positive
and does not change with c while the denominator is positive and increasing in c. Since the second
term is subtracted, raising c tends to increase the right-hand-side of the condition. The ﬁrst term is
increasing since, as c increases, the numerator and denominator both increase by the same amount
and the numerator is smaller than the denominator (and both are positive). Thus, the higher is c
the more likely is a pooling equilibrium.
Turning to τ, it is easy to see that the ﬁrst term of condition 20 is invariant to τ, as (1 − τ)
12factors out of both numerator and denominator. The second term is increasing in τ since the
denominator is proportional to (1 − τ) and the numerator is invariant to τ. Since the second term
is subtracted, its eﬀect is decreasing in τ. So, as τ increases it is less likely that there is a pooling
equilibrium.
Next, consider PWW. It is straightforward to see that an increase in PWW makes it less likely
that condition 20 will hold (by increasing the left-hand side), and hence for there to be a pooling
equilibrium. Intuitively, this makes sense. A high probability that a well worker may become sick
next period gives him an extra incentive to pool with sicker workers in both this period and next.
When health is “sticky” this extra incentive is blunted and well workers will less willingly pool with
sick workers.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of a frictionless labor market on the possibility of pooling. The
labor market is frictionless if either c = 0 or τ = 1. As c falls to zero, condition 19 fails to hold
and the well workers fail to pool in period 2. In addition, as c falls to zero, the right-hand-side
of condition 19 goes to minus inﬁnity as the diﬀerences in V but not 1
β(UWU − UWI) go to zero.
Thus, there is no pooling equilibrium with c near zero.
Similarly, as τ goes to 1, the right-hand-side of condition 19 goes to minus inﬁnity as the
diﬀerences in V but not 1
β(UWU − UWI) go to zero. Thus, there is no pooling equilibrium with τ
near 1.
So, a pooling equilibrium is more likely when there are:
• high job switching costs, c
• low exogenous turnover rates, τ
• low levels of health state persistence, (PWW close to zero)
We end this section by belaboring one implication of these comparative static conditions that
will become important in our empirical work. All else equal, in industries where jobs tend to have
high switching costs (and pooling is more likely), healthy and sick workers alike will tend to have
health insurance coverage through their employers. In industries with low job switching costs, it
will be the healthiest workers who end up at ﬁrms where health insurance is not provided; sick
workers will choose the ﬁrms that provide insurance anyway.4 Thus, the eﬀect of switching cost on
4We thank Neeraj Sood and Douglas Staiger for helping us see this point.
13insurance will be greater for healthy than for sick workers.
4 Empirical Tests
We examine how industry level turnover, health state persistence, and switching costs aﬀect the
probability that workers are covered by employer provided health insurance. We test both the direct
implications (high τ, low c, and high PWW increase health insurance coverage probabilities) and
the interaction implications (the change in coverage occurs disproportionately among well workers)
of the model.
4.1 Data
We use data from the 1995-2005 March Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplements merged
with information from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). The CPS is collected
every month by the Census Bureau, with over 50,000 respondents each month. The O*NET data
are collected occasionally by the U.S. Department of Labor, and are intended to provide information
about skill requirements and occupational characteristics for a comprehensive set of occupations.
The O*NET database supersedes the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which was last updated in
1991. We use version 5.1 of the O*NET database, which was last updated in 2004.5
The O*NET data include a wide variety of information about what sorts of skills are required
and what sorts of activities are performed in each job. We focus, however, on measures of human
capital necessary to perform a job. In particular, the O*NET questionnaire assesses the number of
months of formal on-site or in-plant training required to do the job (ost), as well as the number of
months of informal on-the-job training required (ojt). We view these two variables as measures of
speciﬁc human capital (Becker, 1994). In addition, the O*NET questionnaire assesses the number
of years of formal education (required education) and related work experience in other jobs (related
work) required to perform the job. We view these as measures of general human capital.6
While the O*NET data are measured at the occupation level, to conduct our tests, we need
measures of employment stickiness at the industry level. Since our theory is about the provision of
5Detailed information about the O*NET database can be found at http://www.doleta.gov/programs/onet/
6O*NET reports the values of these human capital variables in ranges, along with the probabilities that employees
in each occupation fall within these ranges. We construct means by taking the mid-point of each range as the value
for each range as a whole.
14health insurance by ﬁrms and since IRS regulations require signiﬁcant uniformity across occupations
within ﬁrms in health insurance provision, an occupation level measure of “stickiness” would be
inappropriate. To convert the O*NET variables to the industry level, we use information on the
proportion of workers in each industry in every occupation. We derive this information from the
5% Census 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS).7 Because of the large sample sizes in the
PUMS data, we can derive precise industry level occupation weights.8 Using these occupation
weights, we calculate ost, ojt, required education, and related work at the industry level separately
for each of the four major Census regions.
In some of our analyses, we use information on industry cross region level job turnover rates.
Unfortunately, this information is not available in the O*NET database and cannot be derived
from the PUMS data, as these data are a cross section. Instead, we use merged CPS data from
November 1994 through December 2005 to calculate job turnover rates (Fallick and Fleischman,
2004).9 We present results using job turnover measured at three months, but our qualitative results
remain the same if we use one, two, or three month turnover.10
Using this same merged CPS sample, we construct measures of industry and region level health
status persistence (PWW). CPS respondents are queried about their general health on a ﬁve point
scale (where 1 is excellent health, 2 is very good health, 3 is good health, 4 is fair health, and 5
is poor health). We deﬁne a transition from a well to a sick state as when a respondent reports
excellent health in year t, and then reports less than excellent health in year t + 1.11 We link the
7We thank the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (http://www.ipums.umn.edu) for
making these data available.
8In the 2000 Census, industry is classiﬁed using the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) and
occupation is classiﬁed using the Census 2000 occupational coding system. We use a standard crosswalk, available
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) website to translate between the NAICS and earlier systems for classifying
industries used in the 1995-2002 CPS. We use similar crosswalks (also available at the BLS website) to translate
between the occupation coding system in the Census and the occupation coding in the CPS.
9The sampling strategy of the CPS involves administering four monthly questionnaires (Months 1-4) to a family,
followed by an eight month recess, and then four more months of interviews (Months 5-8). Because of this sampling
technique, all households who are interviewed in March through June, say, of year t are also interviewed in March
through June of year t + 1. People who report employment in Month 1 are asked if they have the same job in each
of Months 2, 3, and 4 Similarly, people who report employment in Month 5 are asked if they have the same job in
each of Months 6, 7, and 8. Using unique household identiﬁers provided in the CPS data, and a probability match
within each household based upon the age, sex, and race of the respondents, we merge CPS monthly samples from
November 1994 to December 2005. We use so many years of data because the sample sizes in the industry and region
cells would be too small with fewer years.
10Turnover rates over longer intervals are not available in the CPS.
11We experimented with alternate deﬁnitions of well and sick, In particular, we estimated our models deﬁning a
respondent as well if in excellent, very good, or good health, but there were no qualitative changes in our results
using this alternate deﬁnition of health status.
15industry and region level variables (ost, ojt, required education, related work, PWW, turnover, and
mean industry earning) to the 1995-2005 CPS March Supplements.
Health insurance coverage is measured using the March CPS. We code both uninsured indi-
viduals and individuals who are covered by health insurance not through their employer as not
being covered by employer-provided health insurance.12 We exclude people from our sample who
are under age 18 and those who are unemployed or out of the labor force. All of our tests of
the hypotheses involve individual-level regressions using this data set. Table 1 shows means and
standard deviations, using CPS sample weights, for all of the variables included in our models.
4.2 Results
Figures 1 and 2, show the average level of human capital required to perform jobs in each industry
plotted against the probability of employer-provided health insurance coverage. Each point in these
graphs represents an industry. We also plot three month turnover rate against health insurance
coverage. In each graph, we plot the best ﬁtting line representing the relationship between these
points. Our motivation in presenting these graphs is to give the reader a sense for how strongly
the data support our hypotheses in the absence of statistical adjustments.
Figure 1 shows our two measures of speciﬁc human capital (ojt and ost), as well as turnover,
plotted against employer health insurance coverage. Consistent with our hypothesis that high
turnover reduces the likelihood of pooling, workers in industries in which there is high turnover are
substantially less likely to be covered. In industries where job-speciﬁc human capital requirements
are highest, workers are most likely to be covered by their employers. The results from these graphs
are consistent with our hypothesis that pooling is more likely in industries where the costs of job
switching are higher.
Figure 2 plots our two measures of general human capital (required education and related work)
against employer health insurance coverage. These two ﬁgures show that in industries that require
high levels of general human capital, workers are more likely to be covered by their employers.
These results are not predicted by our theory of adverse selection and seem more consistent with a
12We considered using employer oﬀers of insurance as our principal independent variable; however, the CPS does
not generally collect this information. Our results are not sensitive to deﬁning employer health insurance coverage
diﬀerently within the constraints of the CPS data. For example, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we
drop people who who receive insurance through their spouse, other private sources, Medicare, or Medicaid from the
analysis.
16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean S. Dev. Measurement Level
Health Insurance Coverageby Employer 58.39% 49.29 Individual×Year
Female 45.61% 49.81 Individual×Year
Age 38.77% 12.00 Individual×Year
Employer Size: 10-24 9.32% 29.07 Individual×Year
Employer Size: 25-99 12.89% 33.51 Individual×Year
Employer Size: 100-499 13.82% 34.51 Individual×Year
Employer Size: 500-999 5.80% 23.19 Individual×Year
Employer Size: 1000+ 38.82% 48.73 Individual×Year
Health: Very Good 35.83% 47.95 Individual×Year
Health: Good 23.00% 42.08 Individual×Year
Health: Fair 4.63% 21.02 Individual×Year
Health: Poor 0.77% 8.77 Individual×Year
Black 10.43% 30.57 Individual×Year
Non-White, Non-Black Race 4.67% 21.10 Individual×Year
Total Earnings (000s of $) 32.48 36.99 Individual×Year
Mean Industry Earnings(000s of $) 29.52 11.22 Industry×Region
PWW 52.37% 8.40 Industry×Region
Marginal Tax Rate (%) 18.25% 6.08 Individual×Year
Three-Month Turnover Rate 6.39% 2.77 Industry×Region
Pension Plan Coverage 80.23% 39.82 Individual×Year
Req. OJT (yrs) 0.78 0.44 Industry×Region
Req. Education (yrs) 13.04 0.76 Industry×Region
Req. Related Work (yrs) 2.14 0.80 Industry×Region
Req. In-Plant Training (yrs) 0.78 0.53 Industry×Region
N 542,711
Note: Only 310,358 workers in our sample answered questions about employer pension plan coverage.
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story of a segmented labor market, where mainly workers in high-skill-requiring industries receive
health insurance coverage.
Table 2 contains regression coeﬃcients from linear probability models.13 The ﬁrst two columns
show how the probability of having employer-provided health insurance coverage varies with our
measures of human capital (ojt, ost, related work, and required education). We include a number
of variables in all three regressions as controls. For all but the smallest employers, health insurance
provided to workers is not taxed. Workers in higher marginal tax brackets beneﬁt more from
the exemption of health insurance from taxation, thus, workers’ income is an important control
13We present linear probability models throughout rather than probits or logits to facilitate interpretation of the
coeﬃcients (which can be read as marginal eﬀects). The mean marginal eﬀect estimates are substantially the same
whether we use the LPM, probits, or logits. We adjust all standard error estimates for clustering at the industry,
region, and year level.
19variable, as is employer size.14 The regressions also include demographic variables—female, age,
general health status, and race dummies. These regressions directly test our hypothesis that the
probability of employer insurance provision should increase with the costs of switching jobs, since
high levels of job-speciﬁc human capital requirements will increase the costs of switching and
decrease with turnover.
We run two separate regressions, one with and one without turnover, because it is likely that
our measure of turnover is endogenous. In particular, our measure of turnover does not distinguish
between job changes caused for exogenous and for endogenous reasons. For example, there is a
large literature arguing that unhealthy workers with health insurance delay job changes because
they would have diﬃculty ﬁnding coverage at the same level of beneﬁts and at the same price in a
new job (c.f. Gruber and Madrian, 1997).
These regressions provide conﬁrmation for our basic theoretical predictions. Increases in both
measures of speciﬁc human capital, ojt and ost, lead to substantial increases in employer health
insurance coverage (though the coeﬃcient on ojt is not statistically signiﬁcant). By contrast,
increases general human capital lead to either less coverage (related work) or a small and statistically
insigniﬁcant increase in coverage (required education).
Other coeﬃcients also are consistent with our theory. For instance, turnover has a strong nega-
tive association with employer-provided health insurance coverage, and health persistence (PWW)
is negatively associated with insurance provision (though the coeﬃcient is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant). The probability of employer-provided health insurance is increasing in individual and
industry mean income as well as in individual marginal tax rate. However, for reasons we will
discuss in the next paragraph, we do not view these coeﬃcients as providing an entirely convincing
test of our theory.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 show the results of a falsiﬁcation exercise, in which we run the
same regressions as in columns (1) and (2) except that the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether a worker is covered by a pension plan through his employer. Presumably, our theory of
adverse selection in health insurance should not apply in the case of pensions, where health is a
less important driver of pricing. In these pension regressions, none of the human capital measures
have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Some of the other coeﬃcients, such as turnover and PWW,
14In the CPS, employer size is reported as a series of dummy variables, with category 1 representing the smallest
employers (< 10 employees) up to category 6 representing very large ﬁrms (> 1,000 employees).
20Table 2: Switching Costs, Turnover, and Health Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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(0.263) (0.263) (0.304) (0.304)
Non-White, Non-Black Race −1.44
∗∗ −1.43
∗∗ -0.564 -0.555
(0.370) (0.370) (0.406) (0.406)





(0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0378) (0.0378)





(0.376) (0.373) (0.341) (0.338)
PWW -1.89 -1.5 −2.13
+ -1.81






(1.52) (1.52) (1.38) (1.38)
Req. OJT (yrs) 3.26 3.25 -4.86 -4.76
(4.46) (4.48) (4.17) (4.16)
Req. In-Plant Training (yrs) 13.4
∗∗ 14.3
∗∗ 2.83 3.86
(4.59) (4.59) (4.22) (4.22)
Req. Related Wrk (yrs) −5.12
∗ −6.02
∗ 3.50 2.54
(2.54) (2.52) (2.24) (2.21)
Req. Educ. (yrs) 0.643 0.939 -1.37 -1.14





Constant -15.3 -15.5 43.3
∗∗ 43.4
∗∗
(10.5) (10.4) (10.6) (10.5)
Observations 542,711 542,711 310,358 310,358
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.16
Notes: Linear probability regressions. Industry, year, and region cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include a full set of industry, year and region dummies (results not shown).
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
21do have signiﬁcant eﬀects with directions that would be predicted by our theory were it to apply
to pensions. Our interpretation of this is that we should not take the coeﬃcients on turnover and
PWW in the health insurance regressions of columns (1) and (2) as serious tests of our theory—they
may be explained by other labor market forces that we do not model.
We turn next to the interaction test of adverse selection discussed at the end of Section 3.3.
Recall that our theory implies that adverse selection should have its largest eﬀect on healthy workers
in industries with low job switching costs. Sicker workers, regardless of switching costs, and healthy
workers in high switching cost industries should be aﬀected less by adverse selection. This reasoning
suggests a straightforward test: in a regression of employer-provided health insurance, the coeﬃcient
on an interaction term between worker health and our measures of job-speciﬁc human capital should
have a positive sign.
In Figure 3 we plot the predicted values from a bivariate linear regression of employer health
insurance coverage on ojt separately for healthy workers and sicker workers over the full range
of ojt values in our data. Sick workers in industries with high on-the-job training requirements
are just as likely as sick workers in industries with low on-the-job training requirements to be
covered. Healthy workers, by contrast, are about 8 percentage points more likely to be covered in
the industry with the highest on-the-job training requirements than in the industry with the lowest
such requirements. This pattern of results is as our theory predicts.
In Table 3, we conduct the interaction test more systematically. First, we regress health insur-
ance coverage separately on each of the four human capital measures and an interaction term with
health, while controlling for the same demographic and industry level variables shown in Table 2.
These results are shown in column (1) of Table 3: that is, column 1 presents the results from four
separate regressions, one each for ojt, ost, related work experience, and education. The interacted
job-speciﬁc human capital measures have the expected signs: for healthy workers, a one year in-
crease in ojt increases employer coverage by about 3.3 percentage points relative to sick workers;
a one year increase in ost increases it by 3.1 percentage points. By contrast, the interaction re-
sults for general human capital are inconsistent: for healthy workers, a one year increase in related
work experience increases employer coverage by 1.7 percentage points, while a one year increase in
required education actually decreases employer coverage by 1.2 percentage points.
The results in column (2), representing a single regression in which all the human capital and
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23Table 3: Health and Job-Speciﬁc Human Capital Interactions
HI HI Pension Pension




(1.46) (5.41) (1.65) (5.47)
Health is E/VG/G * Req. ojt. 3.35
∗∗ -2.86 -0.588 1.57
(0.650) (3.22) (0.956) (3.75)
Req. plant trn. 5.46
∗∗ 8.06 4.98
∗∗ 6.15
(1.31) (5.27) (1.46) (5.78)
Health is E/VG/G * Req. plant trn. 3.05
∗∗ 5.73
∗ -0.710 -3.34
(0.508) (2.79) (0.783) (4.02)
Req. related work 1.96
∗ -4.77 2.52
∗∗ 2.50
(0.781) (3.12) (0.881) (3.03)
Health is E/VG/G * Req. related work 1.67
∗∗ -0.415 -0.296 0.914
(0.368) (2.02) (0.527) (2.21)
Req. educ. -0.317 0.982 -1.08 -1.05
(0.712) (1.14) (0.813) (1.29)
Health is E/VG/G * Req. educ. −1.20
∗∗ -0.347 0.218 -0.317
(0.426) (0.723) (0.552) (0.964)
Observations 542,711 542,711 310,358 310,358
R-squared 0.26 0.16
Notes: Linear probability model results. Year, region, and industry cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses.
In columns (1) and (3), each pair of cells in the table (human capital measure and the interaction between human
capital and health) are coeﬃcients from a diﬀerent regression. In addition to the terms reported in the table, the
regressions include a full set of industry, year, and region dummies as well as controls for age, sex, race, health,
employer size, earnings, average industry earnings, PWW, marginal tax rate (results not shown).
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
interaction terms are entered together, are even more striking. The only statistically signiﬁcant
result among the interaction terms is for required in-plant training. Among healthy workers, a one
year increase increases employer coverage by 5.7 percentage points relative to sicker workers. Neither
of the interaction terms involving the general human capital measures are statistically signiﬁcant
and their point estimates are negative. The same is true for the ojt interaction term. Generally
speaking, these results provide some conﬁrmation for our theory—presumably multicollinearity
explains the insigniﬁcance of the ojt interaction term.
Finally, columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 replicate the speciﬁcation in columns (1) and (2), except
we use pension plan coverage rather than health insurance as the left-hand-side variable. This
falsiﬁcation test is analogous to the one we show in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. In these
regressions, none of the health and human capital interaction terms are statistically distinguishable
from zero. As in Table 2 these results fail to falsify our predictions on the eﬀect of human capital.
245 Conclusion
The literature on adverse selection commonly asserts that one beneﬁt of employer provided health
insurance is that it enforces pooling of risks across sick and well people within a ﬁrm. This allows
the “insurance” aspect of health insurance to work, so long as people do not decide where to work
based upon their health status.
Our theoretical section develops this idea and examines the conditions under which the labor
market can solve the adverse selection problem in health insurance. In a frictionless labor market,
the adverse selection problem from the health insurance market simply “spills over” into the labor
market, rendering employer provision impotent as a corrective. By contrast, if it is costly to switch
jobs and if health status is not too sticky, then employer provision can solve the adverse selection
problem. Furthermore, when employer provision fails to solve the adverse selection problem, the
theory predicts that the increased uninsurance will fall disproportionately on healthier workers.
We take this theory to data from the Census’s Current Population Survey and the Dept of
Labor’s O*NET database. Our estimates reveal that, controlling for several salient variables,
industries with stickier labor markets (jobs requiring more speciﬁc human capital) have statistically
signiﬁcantly higher rates of health insurance. Furthermore, it is primarily healthy workers who see
increasing coverage rates. However, the eﬀect sizes we measure are modest. According to our
estimates, moving a worker from an industry with the average level of required on-the-job training
(0.8 years) to the industry with the maximum (2.3 years) would increase coverage by 5.6 percentage
points. On average, coverage rates in our data are 56% (and 57% for healthy workers).
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